# Applicability of National Board Testing Data to Reliability for Industry

### 2012 National Board/ ASME General Meeting Nashville, TN



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### **Overview of National Board Capacity Certification Program**

- 2 samples pressure relief devices (PRD's) tested every six years
- Test requirements come from ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code
- National Board Inspector witnesses manufacturing/ assembly to assure samples are done to normal procedures
  - May include devices selected from stock
- Not intended to be statistical in nature



### **Overview of National Board Capacity Certification Program** (cont.)

- "Penalty" test of 2 for 1 required upon test failure
- Corrective action is then required
- Tests performed at ASME/NB accepted test lab
- What does collected test data show for PRD Users?



### **Some Numbers...**

# Data on large number of tests was reviewed to look for trends, patterns etc.

#### Total number of tests included in the review: 21825



## How Data was Analyzed

**1. Included data from National Board and other accepted test labs** 

- **2. Started from the year 2000** 
  - Includes rupture disks as certified devices
- **3. Includes VR verification tests**
- 4. Does not include "provisional", R&D or informational tests

# 5. Does not include "investigation" tests (more on this later)



### **Limitations of the Review**

#### **Represents lower pressures/ smaller sizes**

Economic reality of testing

### "Cleanliness" of the data



### Some Numbers...

### **Breakdown by ASME Code Section**

- Section I 13.6%
- Section III
- Section IV

3.4%

12 tests

Section VIII 83.0%



## Some Numbers...

#### Test medium used

- Steam 25.6%
- Air 48.6%
- Water 25.7%

#### **Section VIII per medium**

- Steam 10.6%
- Air 58.5%
- Water 31.0%




### **Raw Results**

<u>Test outcomes</u>	%	<b>Amount</b>
Pass	84.9%	18538
Fail Set Pressure	7.1%	1541
Fail Blowdown	1.8%	383
Fail Capacity	5.4%	1186
Fail Operation	0.2%	43
Incorrect lift	0.1%	19
N/A	0.5%	113



### **Raw Results**






# **Analysis of Failures**

#### Set pressure

- Failures represent valves out of Code tolerance
- What is "unsafe" level?
- 0.3% were above 116% of nameplate set pressure






# Analysis of Failures (cont.)

#### Capacity

- Includes valve capacities less than rated
  - Common cause: Valve fails to achieve "secondary lift"
- Includes liquid valves failing to open by specified overpressure
- Includes rupture disk flow resistance(K<sub>R</sub>) / Minimum Net Flow Areas (MNFA) not to specification



### Distribution Where Capacity was Measured



# Analysis of Failures (cont.)


#### **Other Capacity Issues**

- 247 other failures where capacity was not measured (1.1%)
- Typical failure to open before 10% above set mostly liquid valves
- Typical opening point in these cases is 12% to 15% above set



# **Rupture Disk K<sub>R</sub> Problems**

Test Kr/Cert. Kr





### **Rupture Disk Capacity Problems**

Data includes 128 Kr failures (0.7%)

Disk opened where Kr measurement is reported: 20 samples more the 5X certified Kr (.09%)

Includes 18 failures to open (0.08%)

Some were reversal without opening

### 6 MNFA failures (insufficient disk opening)



## **Blowdown Problems**

#### **Represented 1.8% of test samples**

#### Affect of blowdown on overpressure protection

- (More of an operational concern)
  - Section I short blowdown
  - Section VIII adjustable design exceeding 7%



### **Other Problems...**

# Fail Operation0.2%(43 valves)

Includes lift lever problems, valves "stuck open" etc.

Incorrect lift 0.1% (19 valves) Restricted lift valves with lift not set properly (usually too high)



# Summary

**Estimates of PRD problems:** 

Set pressure problems: 0.3%

Valve Capacity problems: 0.54%

**Rupture Disk Kr problems: .09%** 

**Rupture Disk, failure to open: .08%** 

**Total: 1.01%** 

Pressure Relief Device Availability Estimate: 98.99%



# **Investigation Testing**

**130 Investigation tests** 

37: Pass

70: N/A

11: Fail set

8: Fail capacity

4: Fail blowdown

Most problems noted were caused by lack of maintenance



### Recommendations

- Recognize value of Code/NB Certification
  - Tight requirements provide extra margin for safety
  - Test issues cause suppliers to "tighten up"
  - NB Test capabilities to be expanded



### Recommendations

- Provide feedback
  - PRD Suppliers
  - Regulatory Authorities
  - National Board when certification is suspect
- Mandate In-Service Inspection at intervals *supported by Inspection History*

